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ZSOLT DARVAS
Whenever the European Union’s budget is discussed, much of the political 
focus is on net balances – whether countries pay in more than they receive 
– rather than on the broader overall positive effects of EU spending. The
largest net contributor countries have sought to limit their contributions,
leading to the build-up of an ad-hoc, complex, opaque and regressive
system of revenue corrections.
To inform debate on the 2021-2027 EU budget, I estimated the impact on net 
balances of the 2018 European Commission multiannual budget proposal, 
under three scenarios: elimination of rebates for all of the 2021-2027 new 
budget period, gradual elimination of rebates and non-elimination of 
rebates. These estimates were done on the basis of the EU’s ‘operating 
budgetary balance’ indicator, and on the basis of a new and broader 
indicator, the ‘net direct balance’. The calculation also takes into account 
the estimated net contribution of the United Kingdom to the 2021-2027 EU 
budget based on the draft EU-UK withdrawal agreement.
Under the baseline scenario of the Commission’s proposal, those member 
states that currently benefit from rebates would face between 0.01 percent 
of GNI and 0.06 percent of GNI increases in their net contributions to the 
EU budget, measured by the EU’s operating budgetary balance indicator. 
Meanwhile, central and eastern European member states that received 
several percent of their GNI as net payments from the EU in 2014-2020 
would face significant reductions, though they would still receive net 
payments of about two percent of their GNI in 2021-2027.
The methodology in this paper can be easily applied to estimate the net 
balance implications of any new MFF proposal.
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1 Introduction 
The discussion about the European Union’s budget is frequently centred on the balance between 
payments into the EU budget and EU spending in a particular country. Notwithstanding the difficulties 
in quantifying the overall impacts of the EU budget on member states’ national budgets (Box 1), those 
countries that pay the largest net contributions according to the available indicator have sought to 
reduce their contributions. This effort has resulted in the build-up of an ad-hoc, complex, non-
transparent and regressive system of revenue correction mechanisms. 
In this paper, I estimate the impact on net balances of the Juncker Commission’s 2018 Multiannual 
Financial Framework (MFF) proposal (European Commission, 2018a). At time of writing, this proposal 
is still being discussed, with the Finnish Presidency of the EU having proposed some changes. But so 
far the Juncker Commission’s proposal is the only comprehensive proposal publicly available. The 
methodology I develop in this paper can be applied easily to estimate net balances under any new 
proposal. 
 
Estimating what the net balances would be under an MFF proposal is challenging. On the expenditure 
side, a complicating factor is the difference between ‘commitment appropriations’ (or ceilings on 
spending promises), ‘payment appropriations’ (or ceilings on possible payments) and actual 
payments1. MFFs so far have included ceilings for commitment appropriations and payment 
appropriations and the Juncker Commission’s 2021-2027 MFF proposal followed this tradition: 1.11 
percent of gross national income for commitment appropriations and 1.08 percent of GNI for payments 
appropriations. However, it is actual payments that matter for net balances, and therefore commitment 
and payment appropriations must be translated into expected actual payments. Typically, actual 
payments are about 6 percent lower than commitment appropriations and 3 percent lower than 
payment appropriations. My main assumption is that from 2021-2027, the ratio of actual payments 
over commitment appropriations will be the same as in 2014-2020. 
1 See Darvas et al (2017) for the definition and interpretation of these categories. 
Box 1: Shortcomings of EU budget net balance indicators 
Any indicator of countries’ net balances with the EU has major shortcomings, because the 
payments figures do not take into account numerous direct and indirect benefits for a member 
state arising from EU spending in other member states. For example, companies can participate in 
EU programmes financed outside of their home countries. EU spending in a country can generate 
imports from other EU countries. If EU funds improve the economic outlook of the beneficiary 
country (even in the short term), the implication is a larger European market benefitting all 
countries. All these direct and indirect effects create jobs and tax revenues at home from EU 
spending in other EU countries, but not included in net balance indicators. 
Furthermore, spending on EU-wide public goods benefits every EU country. For example, increased 
EU spending on migration management in Greece after 2015 was vital otherwise even more 
irregular immigrants would have entered the EU. EU support for the fight against climate change in 
high greenhouse-gas emitting countries benefits all countries, even beyond the EU. Net balance 
indicators do not take into account these broader benefits arising from EU spending in other EU 
countries. 
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Identifying the allocation of actual payments to countries is another challenge that influences the 
calculation of net balances. For some programmes, such as cohesion and agricultural policies,  pre-
allocations exist2, but not all countries are able to absorb available EU funding and thus the 
distribution of actual payments differs from the distribution of pre-allocations. For other programmes, 
such as research funds, there are no per-country pre-allocations. 
• European Commission (2019b) has indicated the proposed pre-allocation of agricultural and 
cohesion commitments to EU27 countries corresponding to the Juncker Commission’s proposal. 
These numbers need to be translated into actual payments, which depend on the absorption rate. 
My main assumption is that the rate of absorption in 2021-2027 will be the same as in 2014-
2020. I also assume that countries lagging behind with absorption in 2014-2018 will improve 
somewhat in 2019-2020.  
• No information is available on the per-country allocation of spending in categories beyond 
agriculture and cohesion. Spending in areas other than agriculture and cohesion therefore cannot 
be allocated to countries based on the MFF proposal. My guiding assumption is that the 
distribution of these specific programmes in the next MFF will be the same as the distribution of 
actual allocations in the annual budgets from 2014 to 2018, except for some new spending 
priorities such as border control, for which I assume spending will be proportional to GNI. 
In terms of revenues, the Juncker Commission proposed new revenue streams on the basis of a yet-to-
be adopted common consolidated corporate tax base (CCCTB), the EU’s emission trading system (ETS) 
and a levy on non-recycled plastic waste (European Commission, 2018a). While the Commission 
presented some estimated ranges for the total EU budget revenues from these new sources, estimates 
for proportion of these revenues from each country were not given. The Commission also proposed a 
major simplification of the value added tax (VAT)-based own resources calculation methodology. I try 
to stick to the calculation methods proposed by the Commission as much as possible based on 
publicly available information. The proposed reduction in the retained value of customs duty is 
computationally simple, but a projection for future customs duty revenues is needed. 
The exit of United Kingdom from the EU will have an impact on the next MFF. According to the October 
2019 EU-UK draft withdrawal agreement, which has been endorsed by the European Council and the 
UK House of Commons, the UK will contribute its share of the 31 December 2020 value of outstanding 
EU budget commitments and will pay liabilities related to the pensions of the employees of EU 
institutions, while ongoing EU programmes will continue to be executed in the UK after Brexit. I 
estimate both the UK contribution to the next MFF and EU payments in the UK during the next MFF. On 
balance, the UK will contribute to the next MFF in net terms if the October 2019 withdrawal agreement 
is ratified. Since there is a reasonable probability of ratification, I include the estimated UK net 
contribution to the next MFF in my calculations. 
A further factor is that the EU’s ‘operating budgetary balance’ (OBB) indicator considers only a subset 
of EU payments and revenues. For example, revenues from customs duties are not included in OBB – 
for good reasons. However, the Juncker Commission also proposed to reduce the share of customs 
revenues retained for ‘collection costs’ from 20 percent to 10 percent, which would have direct 
budgetary consequences for member states, but this factor is not included in the OBB indicator. To 
account for this and other factors, I develop a new indicator that I call ‘net direct balance’ (NDB), which 
considers all EU budget expenditures and a much higher share of EU budget revenues. I present 
results both for OBB and NDB. 
2 See https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/eu-budget/spending/country/pre-allocations_en.  
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A final complicating issue is the treatment of various rebates and other revenue correction 
mechanisms, for which I calculate three alternative scenarios:  
(1) Such mechanisms are abolished as of 1 January 2021 (except the corrections for the security and 
citizenship opt-outs of Denmark and Ireland); 
(2) They will be reduced gradually between 2021 and 2025 as proposed by the European Commission 
(again, with the exceptions of the security and citizenship corrections for Denmark and Ireland); 
(3) They remain in place in the full period from 2021 to 2027 (except for the UK rebate and the rebates 
on the UK rebate). 
Throughout the paper I make transparent assumptions. I start by presenting data on net balances 
during the first five years of the current MFF, 2014-2018, for which data on the execution of the EU 
budget is available. Then I discuss and quantify the impact of rebates on all EU countries from 2014 to 
2018 – which I believe in itself reveals several less-known facts. This is followed by an analysis of the 
2021-2027 MFF based on the Juncker Commission’s proposal (European Commission, 2018a). I 
estimate the expected actual payments from the EU budget in each EU country, and EU budget 
revenues from each EU country, under the three rebate scenarios listed above. Finally, I compare net 
balances under the current MFF with estimated net balances under the proposed 2021-2027 MFF. 
2 Net balances under the EU budget in 2014-2018 
EU budget financial reports and data on the budget execution3 show how the ‘operating budgetary 
balance’ (OBB) is calculated4. OBB is widely used as an indicator of countries’ net financial 
contributions to the EU budget. It takes into account 80.6 percent of EU spending and 76.8 percent of 
EU revenues (based on 2014-2018 data; see Table 1). In this paper I develop an alternative measure 
that I call ‘net direct balance’ (NDB) with the EU budget, which covers 100 percent of EU spending and 
90.2 percent of EU revenues from 2014 to 2018. 
Table 1: Share of EU payments and revenues in total EU payments and revenues considered by net 
balance indicators 
  
2014-2018 2021-2027 
Operating budgetary balance (OBB) Payments 80.6% 75.5% 
 
Revenues 76.8% 64.9% 
Net direct balance (NDB) Payments 100.0% 100.0% 
  Revenues 90.2% 92.0% 
Source: Bruegel. Note: the 2014-2018 data based on the actually executed budgets; the 2021-2027 values are estimates 
as described later in this paper.  
No indicator of EU budget net balances is perfect. Both the OBB and NDB have various strengths and 
weaknesses. Table 2 compares the items included in the two indicators. 
  
3 See https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/financial-reports_en and 
https://ec.europa.eu/budget/graphs/revenue_expediture.html. 
4 See the definition of OBB on pages 72-73 of European Commission (2019a). 
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Table 2: Comparison of the operating budgetary balance (OBB) and net direct balance (NDB) 
indicators 
 
OBB includes: NDB includes: 
Expenditures 
     Expenditures allocated to member states except administration yes yes 
   Expenditures on EU administration no yes 
   Earmarked expenditures no yes 
   Other expenditures no yes 
   Expenditures in non-EU countries no yes 
Revenues 
    Own resources based on GNI and VAT yes yes 
  All rebates yes yes 
  Custom duties (and earlier sugar levies) no yes 
  Surplus from previous year no no 
  Other revenues no no 
  Proposed new own resources for 2021-2027 no yes 
Source: Bruegel. Note: ‘Expenditures allocated to member states’ refers to EU spending for which the country in which EU 
money is spent can be determined unambiguously. This is just part of the EU money spent in member states, because for 
some EU spending the destination country cannot be determined unambiguously. 
The OBB covers only that part of money spent in member states (beyond spending on administration) 
for which the location of spending can be determined unambiguously. OBB excludes ‘earmarked 
expenditures’, ‘other expenditures’, and expenditures in non-EU countries, which accounted for 4.9 
percent, 3.3 percent and 5.7 percent, respectively, of total EU expenditures from 2014 to 2018. 
‘Earmarked’ and ‘other’ expenditures are spent in EU member states, but it is difficult to tell in which 
countries these payments were made.  
There is a clear rationale for correcting for administration, given that a disproportionally large amount 
of administrative EU spending goes to Belgium and Luxembourg, because of the EU institutions 
present in these countries. EU institutions work for the whole EU and thus all EU countries benefit from 
spending on administration. Given this benefit, the complete exclusion of administration spending 
from net balances leaves an important ‘EU public good’ outside the calculation. In my NDB calculations, 
I assume that administrative spending benefits member states proportionally to their gross national 
incomes (GNI) and apportion administrative spending to EU countries proportionally to their GNI. 
Sharing out a category of spending between countries proportionally to their GNI influences net 
balances, even if most of the national contributions to the EU budget are based on the distribution of 
GNI. The reason is that other EU money (that is, 80.6 percent of actual EU spending considered by OBB 
from 2014 to 2018, see Table 1) is not spent in member states according to GNI (for example, 
agricultural subsidies do not follow GNI). If the remaining 19.4 percent of EU spending is attributed to 
member states according to GNI, then the overall sharing out of EU spending will be somewhat closer 
to the actual distribution of GNI than if only the 80.6 percent of EU spending covered by OBB is taken 
into account.  
Money from the EU budget spent in non-EU countries reflects the global role of the EU. Without such EU 
spending, member states would presumably still spend this amount from their national budgets 
outside the EU for the same purposes. For this reason, I include money from the EU budget spent 
outside the EU in my NDB calculations as if these expenditures were made in EU member states 
proportionally to their GNI.  
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I also consider ‘earmarked’ and ‘other’ expenditures as if they were spent in EU member states 
proportionally to their GNI. 
Among the revenues, the OBB only considers the so-called ‘national contributions’, which are 
composed of VAT-based own resources, GNI-based own resources and the various rebates and 
corrections. It does not include customs duties, which is sensible, given that the EU is a customs union 
with a common foreign trade policy.  
In the 2014-2020 MFF, member states retained 20 percent of customs duties as ‘collection costs’. The 
Juncker Commission proposed to reduce this rate to 10 percent, which will impact the cash-flow 
budget balance of member states as a result from a change to the EU budget. Therefore, I also include 
customs duty revenues transferred by member states to the EU budget in my NDB indicator. 
The OBB does not include ‘other revenues’, which include fines imposed on companies for infringing EU 
competition rules, interest on late payments, and contributions from non-EU countries. This revenue 
amounted to €51.5 billion in total from 2014 to 2018. I do not allocate this revenue to member states 
either. 
While the EU budget should be balanced, in practice it always ends up with a surplus. In 2014-2018, 
the cumulative amount of surpluses was €20 billion, a relatively large amount. Since a surplus each 
year is supposed to reduce the gross contributions of member states in the subsequent year, I do not 
allocate this surplus to member states. 
Finally, the Juncker Commission proposed new own resources based on the yet-to-be adopted 
common consolidated corporate tax base (CCCTB), the EU’s Emission Trading System (ETS) and a levy 
on non-recycled plastic waste. The OBB would not include these contributions (unless the definition of 
OBB is revised), but I estimate the potential revenues from member states and include them in my 
NDB calculations. 
Table 1 shows that a lower share of EU expenditures and revenues would be included in OBB 2021-
2027 than in 2014-2020. This decline results from the following factors: 
• The proposed integration of the European Development Fund in the EU budget for 2021-2027, 
which was outside the EU budget in 2014-2020; 
• EU spending in the UK in the 2021-2027 MFF5; 
• The proposed new own resources. 
It should be noted that the OBB calculation adopts a particular adjustment to ensure that the sum of 
the net balances of the 28 member states is zero. Consequently, the reported OBB values do not 
correspond to actual net balances arising from the expenditure and revenue items considered (Table 
2), but represent adjusted values. Without this, the sum of national OBBs would have resulted in an 
overall surplus of €16.8 billion, or 0.023 percent of GNI, in 2014-2018. I apply this adjustment in my 
OBB calculations in order to fully align with the EU methodology. But I do not adjust my NDB 
calculations, because what matters to member states is how much they actually get or pay in net 
terms, and not a hypothetical adjusted value. Since the NDB indicator covers 100 percent of EU budget 
expenditures and 90.2 percent of EU revenues, the sum of national NDBs result in an overall surplus of 
5 According to the October 2019 withdrawal treaty agreed by the UK and the EU27 negotiators and endorsed by the 
European Council and the UK House of Commons, the implementation of EU programmes and activities committed under 
the 2014-2020 and earlier MMFs shall continue to apply to the UK after 31 December 2020 until the closure of those EU 
programmes and activities. See: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/brexit-negotiations/negotiating-documents-article-
50-negotiations-united-kingdom_en.  
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€58 billion, or 0.078 percent of GNI, from 2014 to 2018. A comparison of OBB and NDB should consider 
this overall surplus. 
Figure 1 shows that there is little difference between the two indicators for many countries, but there 
are some notable differences in some cases. The NDB indicator shows somewhat larger negative 
positions than the OBB for Belgium and the Netherlands, mostly because these two countries collect 
large shares of customs revenues because of their well-located seaports, which are not included in 
OBB. In contrast, NDB shows slightly lower negative contributions from the other net contributor 
countries (Germany, Sweden, Austria, the UK, Denmark, France, Finland and Italy).  
Figure 1: Net balances with the EU budget, % of GNI, average of 2014-18 
 
Source: Bruegel based on European Commission data for the operating budgetary balance; own calculations for net balance 
as described in the text. 
Net balances also reflect redistribution within the EU, which typically goes from countries with higher 
GNI per capita to countries with lower GNI per capita. Figure 2 confirms this relationship, but there are 
some exceptions. Among the net beneficiaries, Hungary received the greatest EU support as a share of 
GNI from 2014 to 2018, though Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia had much lower GNIs per capita, while 
Poland and Latvia had broadly the same GNI per capita. Of these countries only Bulgaria received a 
similar level of EU funding to Hungary as a share of GNI. Among higher income countries, Luxembourg 
has clearly the largest GNI per capita, but was not a net contributor to the EU budget, and was even a 
net beneficiary based on the NDB indicator. The same conclusion applies to Ireland, the country with 
the second largest GNI per capita after Luxembourg. Italy’s net contribution was just slightly lower than 
the net contributions of most western and northern European countries, even though Italy’s GNI per 
capita is significantly lower. 
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Figure 2: GNI per capita vs net balances with the EU budget, average of 2014-18 
 
Source: Bruegel based on AMECO dataset November 2019 for GNI; European Commission data for OBB; author’s calculations 
for NDB as described in the text. Note: GNI per capita is measured at purchasing power standards (PPS) relative to the EU28 
average. 
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3 Rebates on rebates and other corrections 
Various ad-hoc corrections to the financial contributions of some members states to the EU budget 
have been introduced since the mid-1980s (see eg D'Alfonso, 2016): 
• UK rebate: Since 1985, the UK has been entitled to a financial rebate of about 66 percent of its net 
contribution to the EU budget of the previous year. While the basic concept of the UK rebate has 
remained the same, the formula to calculate it has been amended many times, making the 
calculations demanding, and has led to a complicated system of rebates. The UK rebate is 
adjusted retroactively up to three years later, as new information becomes available (see Box 2 in 
Darvas et al, 2018, for the current rebate formula). From 2014 to 2018, the UK rebate averaged 
€5.6 billion a year. 
• Rebates on the UK rebate: In principle, the cost of the UK rebate is divided among the other EU 
countries in proportion to their share of the EU’s GNI (excluding the UK), but there are exceptions. 
From 1985 to 2001, Germany paid only two-thirds of its normal share of the UK rebate, while since 
2002, Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden have paid only one-quarter of their normal 
shares of the UK rebate. Between 2014 and 2018, a GNI-based sharing-out of the UK rebate would 
have implied a 0.044 percent of GNI extra contribution from the other 27 countries. But these four 
countries pay only 0.011 percent of their GNI for the UK rebate and thus the remaining 23 
countries pay 0.065 percent of their GNI to compensate for the lower payments of the four 
countries. 
• Reduced call rate for the value added tax (VAT) based contributions: In the 2007-2013 MFF, 
Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden benefited from temporary corrections in the form 
of reduced call rates for the VAT-based resource, ranging between 0.1 percent and 0.225 percent, 
instead of the standard 0.3 percent rate applied to all other member states (D'Alfonso, 2016). For 
the 2014-2020 MFF, Austria lost its privileged status and only Germany, the Netherlands and 
Sweden benefitted from a 0.15 percent call rate, half of the call rate applied to the other 25 
countries, which remained at 0.3 percent6. There is ‘capping’: the VAT base to which the call rate is 
applied cannot exceed 50 percent of the GNI of the member state. And before capping and 
applying the call rate, the VAT base is harmonised across EU member states, which is “based on a 
complex methodology”, involving “unwieldy computations” and calculations that are 
“cumbersome and generate onerous administrative work”, as argued by European Commission 
(2018b). 
• Lump-sum reductions on GNI-based contributions: In the 2007-2013 MFF, annual reductions were 
granted to the Netherlands (€605 million a year in constant 2004 prices) and Sweden (€150 
million a year in constant 2004 prices) on their GNI-based contributions. In 2014-2020, measured 
in 2011 prices, Denmark pays €130 million less a year, the Netherlands pays €695 million less a 
year and Sweden pays €185 million less a year7. Austria also benefitted from reduced GNI-based 
contributions, but only for three years: in 2014 (€30 million), in 2015 (€20 million) and in 2016 
(€10 million) – perhaps to sweeten a bit its dropping-out from the group of countries eligible for 
VAT-based reductions. 
• Corrections related to security and citizenship opt-outs: Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom 
are exempt from financing specific parts of security and citizenship policies, for which they have 
opt-outs under the Amsterdam Treaty, with the exception of the related administrative costs. On 
average over 2014-2018, Denmark received €10 million annually, Ireland €6 million and the UK 
€75 million. 
6 See further information at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/eu-budget/revenue/own-resources/value-added-tax_en.  
7 See further information at https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/eu-budget/revenue/own-resources/correction-
mechanisms_en and in D'Alfonso (2016). 
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Unlike the UK rebate, the other corrections are financed by all member states, including those that 
benefit from the reductions, based on their shares of EU GNI. 
I also note (but do not analyse in this paper) that there is a so-called ‘hidden rebate’ related to customs 
duties. The EU is a customs union with a common foreign trade policy, so it is sensible that customs 
duty revenues go to the EU budget. However, member states retain 20 percent of customs duty 
revenues as ‘collection costs’, which is excessively high and benefits those countries that have well-
located seaports, including Belgium and the Netherlands. 
Figure 3 on the next page shows the total impact of these corrections, both in euros (top panel) and as 
a share of national GNI (bottom panel)8.  
  
8 Figure 3 in European Commission (2018b) reports the euro values of some corrections for Germany, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, Denmark and Austria. For the reduced call rate on the VAT own resource, the Commission’s chart only reports the 
direct impact of the reduction, but not the total impact, which also results from increased GNI-based contributions to 
compensate for the gaps. My calculation for the direct impact looks identical to the values reported on the chart, eg for 
Germany, my estimate for the direct impact is €1.95 billion, while for the Netherlands it is €0.43 billion. But the gaps left 
by these adjustments are compensated for by larger GNI-based contributions, which all EU countries make, including 
Germany, the Netherlands and even the UK. For Germany, this amounted to €0.58 billion on average a year, leading to a 
total impact of the reduced VAT call rate of €1.95 billion - €0.58 billion = €1.37 billion. Since Figure 3 shows the total 
impact, the values reported in this figure differ from Figure 3 in European Commission (2018b). 
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Figure 3: Average annual corrections and rebates from 2014 to 2018 (€ billions and percent of GNI) 
A) € billions 
 
B) Percent of GNI 
 
Source: Bruegel based on European Commission data . Note: values reported correspond to the change in the contribution 
to the EU budget resulting from the various revenue adjustments, and therefore a positive value implies that a country 
contributes more, while a negative value implies that a country contributes less.  
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In terms of euros, France pays the most, €2.08 billion a year, for all these corrections, followed by Italy 
(€1.54 billion) and Spain (€1.02 billion). The main beneficiary is the UK with €5.08 billion a year, 
followed by the Netherlands (€0.92 billion), Germany (€0.75 billion) and Sweden (€0.32 billion). As a 
share of GNI, 22 EU countries contribute close to 0.09 percent of their GNI to these corrections, to 
benefit the UK (0.22 percent of GNI), the Netherlands (0.13 percent of GNI), Sweden (0.07 percent of 
GNI) and Germany (0.02 percent of GNI). Austria and Denmark are net contributors to the adjustments 
with about 0.035 percent of GNI, since these countries benefit from only some of the corrections.   
This system of rebates and corrections is ad-hoc, opaque and complex and also impacts EU countries 
unevenly, contradicting the equal treatment principle. As recalled by D’Alfonso (2016), the European 
Court of Auditors has long highlighted9 that these correction mechanisms compromise the simplicity 
and transparency of the financing system of the EU budget, and have various shortcomings, including: 
• The absence of defined criteria to assess objectively whether a budgetary burden is excessive and 
when a member state qualifies for a correction; 
• The lack of a monitoring mechanism to establish whether a member state benefiting from a 
correction still qualifies for it; 
• The lack of a monitoring mechanism to establish whether other member states that do not receive 
a correction now qualify. 
These corrections also make national contributions (the sum of VAT-based and GNI-based 
contributions adjusted by the rebates) to the EU budget regressive, as pointed out by the High Level 
Group on Own Resources (2016). That is, richer countries benefitting from rebates contribute less to 
the EU budget as a share of GNI than poorer countries (Figure 4). 
Figure 4: GNI per capita vs national contributions to the EU budget, 2014-2018 
 
Source: Bruegel based on European Commission data on the execution of EU budgets in 2014-2018 and data on GNI per 
capita measured at purchasing power standard (PPS), average of EU28 in 2014-2018. 
9 See https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52005AA0004, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52006AA0002 and https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52012AA0002. 
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The six countries benefitting from the rebates are also the largest net contributor countries (Figure 5). 
Most likely, representatives of these net contributor countries believe that a big share of the EU budget 
is redistributed to countries for spending that does not qualify as European public goods, or that there 
are risks money is improperly use, and that is why they wish to limit their contributions10. The best 
solution would be to reform EU budget spending to provide only European public goods, in which case 
all rebates should be eliminated11. But if such a reform of EU spending is politically impossible, then at 
least the rationale for the rebates should be spelt out clearly and a transparent correction system built 
on clear principles should replace the current ad-hoc, opaque, complicated and regressive system of 
rebates. 
Figure 5: Net contributions to the EU budget – with and without rebates, %GNI, 2014-2018 
 
Source: Bruegel based on European Commission data on the execution of EU budgets in 2014-2018. Note: the EU’s OBB 
indicator is used. 
 
  
10 In Darvas (2019a) I argued that the 1984 Fontainebleau Summit conclusion (“any Member State sustaining a budgetary 
burden which is excessive in relation to its relative prosperity may benefit from a correction at the appropriate time“) 
cannot apply to the net contributor countries receiving various rebates, but the true reason could be that these countries 
aim to limit their net contributions. 
11 With the exceptions of the Irish and Danish corrections for their opt-outs from parts of EU security and citizenship 
policies, because these are related to Treaty-based non-participation in certain EU programmes. 
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4 EU payments in the next MFF 
The Commission’s proposal (European Commission, 2018a) gives commitment ceilings for the MFF as 
a whole and for each programme, as well as the overall ceiling for payments appropriations. There are 
three important issues to consider when estimating which country gets what money. 
4.1 Current versus constant prices  
The Juncker Commission presented EU budget tables both at 2018 constant prices and at current 
prices, by assuming a 2 percent annual inflation rate. As European Court of Auditors (2018, page 5) 
noted, this 2 percent annual deflator adjustment “is an EU budgetary convention and does not 
necessarily reflect the actual rate of inflation in the EU“. Since inflation will likely remain below 2 
percent in the years to come and the historical budget execution tables include current price values, I 
use the current price values throughout this paper. I also use current-price projections of GNI when I 
calculate the ratio of spending and revenue as a share of GNI. 
4.2 Commitment appropriations, payment appropriations and actual payments  
The EU budget has a strange structure in which ‘commitment appropriations’ and ‘payment 
appropriations’ differ. In the 2021-2027 MFF proposal (European Commission, 2018a), commitment 
appropriations amount to 1.11 percent of EU GNI, while the overall ceiling for payment appropriations 
is 1.08 percent of GNI. However, not all payment appropriations are actually spent: in the executed 
budgets between 2014 and 2018, actual payments amounted to 94.4 percent of commitment 
appropriations for these years. The difference between actual payments and commitment ceilings has 
four main causes:  
(1) The payment ceiling is lower than the commitment ceiling; 
(2) Beneficiaries are not always able to absorb the full amount that would be available;  
(3) Some commitments are de-committed; and  
(4) The different time horizons for payments and commitments: money committed in a particular year 
is only partly spent in that year, about half of the committed amount is spent in later years 
(therefore, about half of actual spending in a year results from commitments made in earlier 
years). 
The implication for my calculation is that not all proposed commitment appropriations would actually 
be spent in 2021-2027. I assume that the actual payment/commitment ceiling rates of the main 
spending categories seen from 2014 to 2018 will prevail in 2021-2027 too. Actual payments are 
practically equal to commitments for administration expenses, while for other spending categories, 
the ratio is lower than 100 percent and differs from one category to another. The only tweak I make is 
an assumption that there will be a slight increase in the actual payment/commitment ratio for 
agricultural and cohesion spending in 2019-2020 (as detailed in the next subsection). Thereafter, I 
assume that the resulting 2014-2020 ratio will prevail in 2021-2027. 
4.3 Country allocations and the issue of absorption of EU funds 
European Commission (2019b) presented the proposed pre-allocations of common agricultural policy 
and cohesion/regional policy commitments in the 2021-2027 MFF proposal, in comparison with the 
adopted pre-allocations under the 2014-2020 MFF (Figure 6).  
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Figure 6: Combined agricultural and cohesion policy commitments in the 2014-2020 MMF and the 
proposed 2021-2027 MFF (percent of GNI and percent change in € values) 
A) Percent of GNI 
 
B) Implied percent change in current price € values from 2014-2020 to 2021-2027 
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C) Implied percent change in constant price € values from 2014-2020 to 2021-2027 
 
Source: Bruegel based on data from European Commission (2019b) (panel A) and Bruegel (panels B and C). Note: Panel B 
values were obtained by multiplying the GNI shares from panel A with projected GNI in 2014-2020 and 2021-2027 to 
obtain the € values for both periods, from which percent changes in € values were calculated. Panel C values were obtained 
by deflating values shown in panel B with the expected change in the EU27 GDP deflator, which is 11.7 percent (that is, the 
change in the deflator from the average of 2014-2020 to the average of 2021-2027). I used the EU27 deflator, not country-
specific deflators. Projections for country-specific deflators are available in local currencies, while deflating a euro value 
would necessitate making assumptions about the expected changes in exchange rate, but there is no solid basis for that. 
 
Panel A of Figure 6 shows that there are cuts (as a share of GNI) in aggregate spending on the two 
largest EU budget policies everywhere, especially in central and eastern European member states, 
where this spending amounts to several percent of GNI in the current MFF. Therefore in 2021-2027, the 
EU would spend less relatively on agriculture and cohesion policy. 
However, spending cuts relative to GNI do not necessarily mean cuts in current price € values because 
GNI is expected to grow rapidly. For example, while Bulgaria faces a cut from 4.41 percent of GNI in 
2014-2020 to 3.49 percent of GNI in 2021-2027, GNI is expected to grow by 53 percent over the same 
period, and hence EU commitments are actually expected to grow by 21 percent in current price € 
terms (Panel B of Figure 6). Croatia, Romania and Cyprus are also expected to obtain about 20 percent 
more in commitment appropriations in 2021-2027 than in the preceding seven year period. Malta and 
the Netherlands are expected to face cuts of more than 15 percent, while Hungary, the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia and Austria are expected to receive about 10-12 percent less in commitments. Inflation is 
expected to erode the value of current price changes by 11.7 percent, leaving only four countries to 
see growth in the money they receive for agriculture and cohesion policy (Panel C of Figure 6). 
However, these numbers relate to commitments, while actual payments are influenced by the ability 
of countries to absorb EU funds. For example, in the first five years of the current MFF, Croatia was 
worst in cohesion fund absorption. From 2014 to 2018 on average, EU cohesion payments to Croatia 
amounted to only 0.63 percent of GNI, while total allocations amount to 2.72 percent. It seems unlikely 
that Croatia will be able to catch up with the unspent amounts, because it would mean that not only 
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would spending have to increase to 2.72 percent of GNI in 2019 and 2020, but also that the money in 
the gap between the 2.72 percent allocation and the actually expenditure level of 0.63 percent over 
the five-year long 2014-2018 period would also have to be spent.  
It is not possible to predict how much Croatia and other countries that lag behind with spending will 
actually spend in 2019-2020, nor is it possible to predict actual spending per country relative to the 
available commitments from 2021 to 2027. I have therefore made the following assumptions about 
agricultural and cohesion payments for my calculations:  
(a) In 2019-2020, countries will make up 25 percent of their gaps between commitments and actual 
spending in 2014-2018; 
(b) The ratio of actual payments/commitments in 2021-2027 will be the same as in 2014-2020.  
Assumption (b) implies that possible differences in the actual absorption rate in 2014-2020 and 
2021-2027 will not impact my calculations. 
I also assume that the share of earmarked, other and non-EU agricultural and cohesion spending in 
2021-2027 will be the same as it was from 2014 to 2018. Separating out earmarked, other and non-EU 
payments is important from the perspective of the OBB, which does not include these spending 
categories.  
For other sending categories beyond agriculture and cohesion, the Commission has not presented 
expected country-specific allocations, nor the shares of non-EU, earmarked and other spending. A 
further consideration is that while the European Development Fund is outside the EU budget in 2014-
2020, it would be included in the EU budget in 2021-2027 under the Commission’s proposal. 
Therefore, the share of non-EU spending is set to increase in the next MFF. I make the following 
assumptions for programmes beyond agriculture and cohesion: 
• For most of these programmes, I assume that the distribution of actual payments to EU countries, 
and earmarked, other and non-EU spending in 2021-2027, will be the same as the distribution of 
actual payments from 2014 to 2018. But this assumption cannot be applied to all programmes, 
because some programmes were merged and new programmes were also proposed. I tried to 
match the amended programmes under the proposed MFF with the current MFF’s programmes.  
• For the following programmes I assume that payments will be proportional to the distribution of 
GNI among the 27 EU countries (in brackets I show the total 2021-2027 commitment ceilings for 
these programmes):  
o Integrated Border Management Fund (€9.3bn) 
o Decentralised border management agencies (€12.0bn) 
o Decentralised security agencies (€1.1bn) 
o European Defence Fund (€13.0bn) 
o Military Mobility (€6.5bn) 
Therefore, the €41.9 billion combined commitment ceilings for these spending categories would 
account for 3.3 percent of the total €1,279 billion proposed overall commitment ceiling for 2021-
2027. Given this relatively low share, even if actual distribution differs from the distribution of GNI, 
it will have only a small impact on net balances. And in any case, these spending categories 
correspond well to European public goods from which all EU countries benefit, irrespective of the 
actual place of payment, so it is reasonable to allocate this spending according to GNI. 
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• For a euro-area budget, the Commission has proposed a Reform Support Programme, including a 
Reform Delivery Tool and Convergence Facility, amounting to €25.1 billion in 2021-2027. In 
subsequent negotiations, the Eurogroup opted for a Budgetary Instrument for Convergence and 
Competitiveness (BICC) involving similar amounts. Since it is unlikely that both proposals will be 
simultaneously adopted, I only take into account a €25.1 billion euro-area budget, whatever its 
name will be. I assume that payments will only go to the 19 euro-area countries and only the 19 
euro-area countries will contribute to this budget, without any redistribution (that is, the amount 
paid in by a country will be spent by the EU in that country). The no-redistribution assumption is 
based on the following principle in the term sheet12 agreed by the Eurogroup: “The available funds 
per country should be within an acceptable range of the contributions of that country.” I assume 
that both the contributions to the euro budget from the 19 euro-area countries and EU payments 
from the euro-area budget in the 19 euro-area countries will be proportional to the distribution of 
GNI among the 19 euro-area members. 
Table 3 sets out the results (see at the end of the paper). Panel A of the table reports my projection for 
actual payments in the 2014-2020 MFF: data is available for 2014-2018 and I assume that as a share 
of GNI, payments as a share of commitments in 2019-2020 will be the same as in 2014-2018, except 
for agricultural and cohesion spending (for which I assume some catching-up with the not-yet-spent 
nationally allocated commitments, as described earlier in this section). For my NDB balance indicator, I 
also distribute EU administrative spending and earmarked, other and non-EU spending among 
countries based on their GNI. For 28 EU members, actual spending amounts to 0.96 percent of GNI in 
2014-2020. But if we consider only the 27 countries after Brexit, actual payments amount to 1.06 
percent of GNI in 2014-2020. 
Since administrative and non-EU spending will not decline with Brexit, Panel B of Table 3 distributes 
such spending among the 27 member states. In this case total payments as a share of GNI would 
amount to 1.08 percent in 2014-2020. 
Panel C of Table 3 shows my estimates for the 2021-2027 MFF.  
The largest increases in EU payments are predicted to happen in Cyprus, Luxembourg, the Netherlands 
and Belgium, which will see the total allocated spending they receive rise by between 38 percent and 
67 percent, well above the EU’s average of 15 percent. A major reason for these large increases is that 
certain spending priorities gained more importance, in which the share of these countries is relatively 
large. For Cyprus, the expected rapid GNI increase (38 percent from 2014-2020 to 2021-2027) also 
plays a role, given that the Juncker Commission proposed that cohesion commitments as a share of 
GNI should remain almost unchanged (0.62 percent of GNI in 2014-2020 and 0.59 percent of GNI in 
2021-2027), while agricultural spending hardly declines, and thus rapid GNI increase also implies a 
rapid increase in the € values of that spending. 
While central and eastern European countries are expected to receive EU funding equivalent to about 
2-3 percent of their GNI, the allocated payments are expected to be reduced as a share of GNI, and to 
be reduced even nominally in euros for the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. The reasons 
for nominal reductions arise from the changed structure of the proposed MFF (lower agricultural and 
cohesion commitments, see Figure 6), changed principles for distribution of funding between EU 
countries and the successful economic development of these countries, with their GDP per capita 
12 See https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/06/14/term-sheet-on-the-budgetary-instrument-
for-convergence-and-competitiveness/.  
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having increased relative to the EU average. However, the percent rate of reduction of total allocated 
payments is somewhat lower than what is implied only by the reduction in agricultural and cohesion 
commitments (Panel B of Figure 6), because these countries would also obtain higher funding from 
other programmes. And when we also distribute earmarked, other, non-EU and administrative 
payments among member states, the nominal change for these four countries is close to zero 
(between -4 percent and plus 1 percent) for total distributed spending. 
 
5 EU revenues in the next MFF 
The Juncker Commission (European Commission, 2018a) did not provide any table on total revenues 
broken down by member state contributions and other sources, but made a number of proposals on 
how to improve the financing of the EU budget and presented some estimates on their impact on the 
EU27 as a whole. These included a simplified calculation method for VAT-based own resources, a 
reduced share of retained collection costs from customs revenues, and three new revenue streams 
related to the EU’s Emission Trading System (ETS), non-recycled plastic waste and a revenue on the 
basis of the planned Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB). The Commission also 
proposed the gradual elimination of rebates. Brexit will clearly have an impact on the revenue side of 
the EU budget. 
5.1 Brexit 
Given the UK House of Commons approval of the October 2019 Brexit deal13, it seems likely that the UK 
will leave the EU with a withdrawal agreement. This agreement states that the UK will contribute to the 
2020 EU budget as if it was an EU member and it will also contribute to the 31 December 2020 amount 
of EU outstanding budgetary commitments, or from its French name, reste à liquider (RAL), and to the 
pension and sickness liabilities of EU staff14. I make the following assumptions about the impact of 
Brexit on the 2021-2027 MFF. The calculations are based on an update of Darvas et al (2017) and are 
discussed in detail in Darvas (2019b): 
• The UK will contribute €35.5 billion to the RAL in 2021-2027; 
• EU spending from the RAL in the UK in 2021-2027 will amount €14.3 billion; 
• The UK will contribute €3.9 billion in 2021-2027 to the liabilities of EU staff pensioners; 
• The UK is entitled to a rebate in 2021, amounting to €5.3 billion, since according to the current 
financial regulation, the rebate to the UK is paid in the subsequent year and the UK will fully 
contribute to the 2020 annual budget; 
13 See https://ec.europa.eu/commission/publications/working-document-consolidated-version-withdrawal-agreement-
following-revision-protocol-ireland-northern-ireland-and-technical-adaptations-articles-184-and-185-agreed-
negotiators-level-and-endorsed-european-council_en.  
14 Plus the UK would also contribute to contingent EU liabilities accumulated up to December 2020, should some of them 
turn into actual payment obligations, but I do not consider these, because of their uncertainty. The UK would also receive 
some payments from the EU, such as the UK’s share of the net assets of the European Coal and Steel Community in 
liquidation on 31 December 2020, the UK’s share of the paid-in capital of the European Investment Bank, European 
Investment Fund and European Central Bank, the UK’s share of fines decided up to 31 December 2020 (and fines 
resulting from ongoing procedures even if the fine are decided after 2020). I do not consider these items, partly because 
some of them will be outside the EU budget. See Part Five of the withdrawal agreement on financial provisions for full 
details. 
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• There will be no EU spending in the UK starting from 2021 beyond the €14.3 billion included in the 
RAL15; 
• There will be no customs duty revenues from EU imports from the UK (because eg the transition 
period which keeps the UK in the EU’s customs union is extended, or a temporary or a permanent 
free trade agreement is signed). 
My estimate for the total net contribution of the UK to the EU budget in 2021-2027 is therefore €19.8 
billion. 
5.2 Rebates 
The Commission proposed to convert all kinds of rebates and other revenue corrections to a lump sum 
correction, with gradual reduction up to 2025 and elimination by 2026 (see pages 32-33 of European 
Commission, 2018b). In my calculations I consider three scenarios: 
(1) Revenue corrections are abolished as of 1 January 2021 (except the corrections related to the 
security and citizenship opt-outs of Denmark and Ireland); 
(2) Revenue corrections are gradually eliminated, as proposed by the European Commission (again, 
except the security and citizenship corrections for Denmark and Ireland);  
(3) Revenue corrections remain in place in the full period of 2021-2027 (except the UK rebate and the 
rebates on the UK rebate). 
Note that I have considered the UK rebate in 2021 after the UK’s contribution to the EU budget in 2020 
in the €19.8 billion lump-sum net payment by the UK as a result of Brexit in the previous section. 
I keep the correction related to security and citizenship opt-outs of Denmark and Ireland in all three 
scenarios, because this is related to non-participation in certain programmes. Also, the resulting 
corrections are really minor. First, I calculated these corrections as shares of Danish and Irish GNI from 
2014 to 2018 (without the compensating GNI-based contributions from all member states). I assumed 
that as a share of GNI, these corrections will remain the same in 2021-2027. Then I calculated the 
compensation according to projected GNI in 2021-2027. 
5.3 National contributions based on GNI 
The largest component of contributions to the EU budget is based on the distribution of member states’ 
shares of EU GNI. This source of revenue acts as a balancing item: the gap between planned actual 
payments and all other sources of revenues is covered by contributions based on the share of EU GNI. 
Therefore, any new or increased EU own resource will reduce the GNI-based contributions. Whether a 
country contributes more or less to the EU budget after the introduction of a new revenue source will 
depend on whether its share of the distribution of the base of the new revenue source is higher or 
lower than its share of the distribution of GNI.  
I assume that only euro-area members contribute to the euro-area budget, which explains why GNI-
based contributions are 0.03 percentage points higher for euro-area countries than for non-euro 
countries.  
15 It is possible that the UK will participate in certain EU programmes after 2021. If such an agreement is signed, I presume 
that the UK will pay an additional contribution for its participation in these programmes, which will amount to at least the 
direct cost of the UK’s participation, and possibly more. Since such participation and its financial consequences are 
uncertain, I do not consider them in my calculations. 
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5.4 VAT-based contributions 
Instead of the current complicated system for calculating a harmonised VAT base for the purpose of 
deriving the VAT-based own resources, the Commission proposed a radically simplified method – 
which is sensible in my view. It only uses two data inputs per country: the VAT receipts collected and 
the standard VAT rate. EU countries apply reduced VAT rates to different degrees, but at least 45 
percent of VAT revenue comes from products that are subject to the standard rate16. Therefore, 45 
percent of actual VAT revenues are considered as coming from standard VAT rate products, so a 
measure of ‘standard-rated receipts’ is calculated as 0.45 times total VAT revenues. This is then divided 
by the standard rate to get a ‘standard-rate taxable base’. This base is multiplied by the call rate, for 
which the Commission proposed values between 1 percent and 2 percent, leading to estimated 
revenues between €25 billion and €49 billion per year on average from 2021 to 2027. In my 
calculations I use the middle of this range, 1.5 percent. The source of VAT revenue data is Eurostat’s 
‘Main national accounts tax aggregates [gov_10a_taxag]’ dataset (which currently includes data up to 
2018), while the standard VAT rates are listed in a Commission document17.  
For the projections, I assume that the ‘standard-rate taxable base’ increases at the same rate as GNI. 
For 2019-2021 I use the Autumn 2019 European Commission forecast for GNI, while for 2022-2024 I 
used the GDP forecast in the October 2019 IMF World Economic Outlook. For 2025-2027, I assumed 
that the 2024 forecast annual growth rate will remain unchanged. 
As a result, I estimated that in 2021-2027, total VAT-based own resources will amount to €265.6 
billion, which is very similar to the Commission’s estimate, which is 7*(€25+€49)/2=€259 billion. 
5.5 Traditional own resources: customs duties 
The EU is a customs union with a common foreign trade policy, so it is sensible that customs duty 
revenues go to the EU budget. However, member states retain 20 percent of customs duty revenues as 
‘collection costs’.  
For 2019-2027, I assumed that customs duties will increase at the same rate as the increase in total 
imports of goods18. I used the Autumn 2019 European Commission forecast for nominal import growth 
for 2019-2021, while for 2022-2024 I used the IMF real import growth forecast increased by the GDP 
deflator forecast (a separate import price forecast is not available). For 2025-2027, I assumed that the 
2024 forecast annual growth rate will remain unchanged. The Commission proposed a reduction in the 
amount retained for ‘collection costs’ from 20 percent to 10 percent and I therefore used the 10 
percent value in my calculations19. 
16 From 2011 to 2015, the share of standard-rated goods varied between 46 percent and 99 percent in EU countries. See 
Box 2 in European Commission (2018b).  
17 See 
https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/resources/documents/taxation/vat/how_vat_works/rates/vat_r
ates_en.pdf.  
18 Note that ‘total imports’ includes imports from the EU (which are not subject to customs duties) and imports from outside 
the EU. I implicitly assume that imports from inside and outside the EU will grow at the same rate and there will be no 
compositional changes in imports from outside the EU (since different types of goods are subject to different tariff rates, 
and also the same type of good coming from different countries can be subject to different tariff rate because of  free 
trade agreements and World Trade Organisation commitments). 
19 I note that 10 percent for collection costs would be still much higher than actual costs. In Darvas and Claeys (2018) we 
recommended a much more ambitious approach: reduce the retained value to the actual cost. 
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Up to 30 September 2017, when the production quotas for sugar ended, traditional customs duties 
also included sugar levies. 
5.6 Common consolidated corporate tax base (CCCTB) based own resource 
The Commission proposed a new own resource based on the CCCTB, to be implemented by 2023. It’s 
prospects at time of writing are unclear, but I consider it in my calculations because it is included in the 
Commission’s MFF proposal. 
European Commission (2018b) calculated that a call rate of 1 percent would result in €4 billion in 
revenues on average from 2021 to 2027, while a 6 percent call rate would lead to average revenues of 
€23 billion. I assume that the middle of the range indicated, €13.5 billion per year, or €94.5 billion in 
total between 2021 and 2027, would be collected and distributed between member states. But since 
the CCCTB has not yet been adopted and no statistics are available on it, I distribute this amount 
between member states based on the distribution of forecast gross operating surplus of corporations 
(GOSC) between 2023 and 202720. Data and forecasts for GOSC are available up to 2021 in the autumn 
2019 Commission forecasts21: for 2022-2027, I assumed that it will increase at the same rate as GDP, 
for which I used the October 2019 IMF forecasts.  
The distribution of GOSC is somewhat different from the distribution of GNI for some countries, while for 
most countries the differences are minor. Ireland has the largest positive gap (6.3 percent share in 
GOSC vs. 2.1 percent share in GNI), followed by the Netherlands (6.5 percent vs. 5.8 percent) and 
Romania (2.4 percent vs. 1.9 percent). The largest negative gap is for France (12.7 percent in GOSC vs. 
17.4 percent in GNI), followed by Italy (10.6 percent vs. 12.0 percent) and Germany (24.2 percent vs. 
25.1 percent). This implies that the introduction of this new own-resource will slightly reduce the 
contributions made by France, Italy and Germany (compared to the  baseline of GNI-based 
contributions), and will increase somewhat the contributions made by Ireland, the Netherlands and 
Romania – provided, of course, that the distribution of CCCTB is similar to the distribution of GOSC. 
5.7 Own resource based on EU emissions trading system (ETS) auction revenues 
The Commission (2018a) proposed a new ETS-based own resource that would be calculated by 
multiplying an adjusted indicator of emissions allowances with the auction clearing price and a call 
rate. It estimated that the annual average revenue could vary between €1.2 billion and €3.0 billion per 
year in 2021-2027, depending on the carbon price and auction volumes. The base of this own 
resource, an adjusted indicator of allowances, would include only emissions allowances available for 
auctioning (based on 2005-2007 emissions) and would exclude allowances auctioned for aviation, 
allowances  distributed to lower-income member states via the solidarity provisions and allowances 
related to the Modernisation Fund. 
In my calculations, I assumed that the annual revenue will be in the middle of the range indicated by 
the Commission at €2.1 billion per year, or €14.7 billion in total for 2021-2027. The question is how to 
apportion this amount between the member states, because I could not find any document projecting 
the allocation of emissions allowances for 2021-2027. I have therefore used data on the actually 
auctioned allowances in 2018 as reported by the European Environment Agency’s ETS data viewer22 
20 Here I consider 2023 as the first year, given the proposed introduction of CCCTB in 2023. 
21 Expect for Croatia (latest data is for 2012) and Luxembourg (latest data is for 2017). For these two countries, I assumed 
that GOSC grew the same rate as GNI over the periods of missing data. 
22 See https://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/dashboards/emissions-trading-viewer-1.  
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and adjusted them by the ‘percentage increase of allowances to be auctioned’ resulting from the 
solidarity mechanism for the member states concerned according to Table 1 of Marcu et al (2018).  
France’s contribution to the EU budget would be reduced most by the introduction of this new own 
resource,  because its share of the total amount of adjusted emission allowances is less than half its 
share of EU GNI. Sweden and Germany would also see some reductions, while Poland would contribute 
more via this new own resource, relative to baseline GNI-based contributions. 
5.8 Own resource based on non-recycled plastic packaging waste 
The Commission (2018a) proposed a new own resource based on the volume of non-recycled plastic 
packaging waste. This would align a revenue source for the EU budget with the major EU goal of 
environmental protection and might encourage countries to reduce waste generation and recycle 
more. 
The volume of plastic packaging waste generated in the EU26 (not including the UK and Croatia) 
increased from 12.2 million tonnes in 2005 to 14.4 million tons in 2017, while the share of this waste 
recycled increased from 25 percent to 42 percent over the same period23. European Commission 
(2018b) expects both of these trends to continue: higher volumes and higher recycling. The 
Commission (2018a) estimated that this new own resource could raise between €4 billion and €8 
billion per year on average. I again assumed the middle of this range, €6 billion per year, or €42 billion 
for the full 2021-2027 period. Since I have no information to project the changes in volumes and 
recycling rates by member states, I attribute this amount to countries according to the distribution of 
non-recycled plastic packaging waste in 2016, the latest year for which data is available for all EU27 
countries. 
The largest positive gaps between share of the EU27’s total volume of non-recycled plastic packaging 
waste and the share of EU GNI are in Italy, France and Poland (implying that these countries would pay 
more into the EU budget if this new own resource is introduced), while the largest negative gaps are in 
Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden. 
5.9 Other revenues 
Between 2014 and 2018, the EU annual budgets altogether collected €51.5bn in ‘other revenue’, 
including various fines paid to the EU and contributions from non-EU countries. It is difficult to predict 
such revenues, so I assume that they will remain the same as a share of GNI, implying a total of €79bn 
between 2021 and 2027. 
5.10 Overall estimates for total revenues 
The three panels of Table 5 show the overall results of my calculations under the three scenarios for 
the rebates. GNI- and VAT-based contributions would amount to 0.69 percent of EU GNI, customs 
revenues would contribute by 0.15 percent of GNI, while the three types of new own resources 
combined would add an additional 0.13 percent. The net revenue from Brexit (0.02 percent of GNI) and 
other revenues (fines and contributions by non-EU countries, equalling 0.07 percent), top up the EU’s 
own resources to reach 1.06 percent of GNI, which is my estimate for actual payments under the 
Juncker Commission’s proposal (European Commission, 2018a). 
 
23 Data source: Eurostat’s ‘Packaging waste by waste management operations and waste flow [env_waspac]’ dataset. 
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6 Net balances 
Table 5 sets out the implications of these various inputs for the OBB and NDB net balance indicators, 
under the three rebate scenarios. For the ease of comparison with the current MFF, the table reports 
average annual values in euros and as a share of GNI. 
In scenario 2, in which rebates are gradually abolished as proposed by the Juncker Commission, the 
German and the Dutch net contributions would both increase by 40 percent in current price euros 
according to the OBB indicator, while their GNIs are expected to grow between 24-26 percent. Using the 
NDB indicator, Germany’s net contribution would go up by 34 percent and the Dutch net contribution 
would go up by 47 percent (the reason for this difference is that the reduction of retained customs 
duty revenues from 20 percent to 10 percent would increase the total contributions arriving from the 
Netherlands, but reduce the total contributions arriving from Germany). Therefore, our calculations 
produce a different result from the more-than 100 percent increase for Germany and the 75 percent 
increase for the Netherlands reported in the Financial Times in October 2019 (Khan and Chazan, 
2019), and attributed to government sources24. The 40 percent OBB increase has to be put into 
perspective: as a share of GNI, Germany’s net contribution is expected to go up by 0.04 percentage 
points, while the Dutch contributions would be up by 0.02 percentage points. On the basis of the NDB 
indicator, Germany’s net contribution would go up by 0.01 percentage points, while Dutch 
contributions would go up by 0.05 percentage points. Figure 7 shows the net-balance estimates for all 
EU27 countries.  
  
24 Former budget commissioner Günther Oettinger refuted the 100 percent and 75 percent increase numbers as 
“misleading figures” (see Valero, 2019), but the Commission has not published its estimates for the net balances 
corresponding to its MFF proposal. 
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Figure 7: Net balances with the EU budget, 2014-2020 and 2021-2027 MFF based on the Juncker 
Commission proposal (% national GNI) 
(A) Operating budgetary balance (OBB) 
 
(B) Net direct balance (NDB) 
 
Source: Bruegel. 
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Under scenario 1 – the complete elimination of all rebates after 1 January 2021 – the increase in 
Germany’s net contribution would be between 0.04 and 0.07 percentage points of GNI, while the 
increase in Dutch contributions would be between 0.10 and 0.11 percentage points of GNI, depending 
on the indicator used. The values are similar for the other three EU27 net contributor countries that 
enjoy certain types of rebates, Austria, Denmark and Sweden. 
For Luxembourg and Ireland, the sign of net balance would change. Both countries were net 
beneficiaries from 2014 to 2018 and are expected to be net beneficiaries for the full period of 2014-
2020 according to my calculations, though at a relatively small scale (OBB just 0.01 percent of GNI for 
both countries, NDB 0.09 percent of GNI for Ireland and 0.17 percent for Luxembourg). Between 2021 
and 2027, both countries would make net contributions of 0.12-0.15 percent of their GNI, under the 
Juncker Commission proposal (European Commission, 2018a). 
All other countries are expected to retain their net beneficiary or net contributor status. 
Six central and eastern European countries would receive about one percent of GNI less, namely 
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia. The biggest reduction would be 
for Hungary with a drop of about two percentage points of GNI in its net positive balance with the EU 
budget. However, from 2014 to 2020 Hungary had the largest net positive balance with the EU budget 
amounting to about 4 percent of GNI (section 2, Figure 1), much more than what other countries with 
similar levels of development received. The approximately two percent of GNI net transfer to Hungary 
would be still the fifth highest in the EU. The expected reduction in net EU funding in 2021-2027 
compared to 2014-2020 would be somewhat less than one percent for Estonia, Latvia and Slovenia, 
while Croatia and Cyprus would receive somewhat more (as a share of GNI) in the next MFF than in the 
current MFF. 
France’s position would improve marginally (ie by 0.04 percentage points of GNI under OBB and by 
0.08 percentage points of GNI under NDB, according to the Juncker Commission’s proposal). Spain’s 
net position would improve even less, while Greece and Portugal would face reductions of about 0.2 
percentage points of GNI. 
Overall, with the exception of central and eastern European countries, the changes in net balances (as 
a share of GNI) seem small. 
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Table 3: Comparison of actual payments in the 2014-2020 and 2021-2027 MFFs (€ millions and percent of GNI) 
 
Source: Bruegel. Note: the 2014-2020 MFF does not include the European Development Fund, while the proposed 2021-2027 MFF includes it. This difference accounts for 0.03% of GNI. In the 2021-2027 MFF, EU 
spending in the UK (based on its share in outstanding budgetary commitments) is considered in non-EU spending. 
Unit Category EU28 EU27 BE BG CZ DK DE EE IE EL ES FR HR IT CY LV LT LU HU MT NL AT PL PT RO SI SK FI SE UK
(A) 2014-20 MFF: administration, earmarked, other and non-EU expenditures are distrbuted among EU28
€ Total allocated payments w.o. 
admin
844,888 796,368 19,134 16,481 33,716 10,043 78,471 4,947 13,314 41,304 84,294 96,216 7,513 79,540 1,634 6,895 11,721 2,358 38,140 1,342 16,175 12,901 103,046 29,416 42,808 5,715 17,921 9,646 11,677 48,520
€ EU28 admin distributed by 
EU28 GNI
57,450 48,451 1,667 196 671 1,108 12,291 88 863 679 4,299 8,733 180 6,420 72 101 154 141 451 39 2,767 1,373 1,691 708 694 159 315 844 1,748 8,999
€ Earmarked, other and non-EU 
distributed by EU28 GNI
143,813 121,286 4,174 491 1,680 2,774 30,767 220 2,160 1,699 10,761 21,860 450 16,071 180 253 386 354 1,128 98 6,927 3,436 4,233 1,774 1,736 397 787 2,113 4,376 22,527
€ Total actual payments 1,046,152 966,105 24,976 17,167 36,067 13,926 121,529 5,255 16,336 43,683 99,355 126,809 8,144 102,030 1,887 7,248 12,262 2,853 39,719 1,479 25,869 17,710 108,970 31,898 45,238 6,271 19,022 12,603 17,801 80,047
%GNI Total allocated payments w.o. 
admin
0.78% 0.87% 0.61% 4.46% 2.66% 0.48% 0.34% 2.98% 0.82% 3.22% 1.04% 0.58% 2.21% 0.66% 1.20% 3.62% 4.02% 0.88% 4.48% 1.82% 0.31% 0.50% 3.23% 2.20% 3.27% 1.91% 3.02% 0.61% 0.35% 0.29%
%GNI EU28 admin distributed by 
EU28 GNI
0.05% 0.05% 0.05% 0.05% 0.05% 0.05% 0.05% 0.05% 0.05% 0.05% 0.05% 0.05% 0.05% 0.05% 0.05% 0.05% 0.05% 0.05% 0.05% 0.05% 0.05% 0.05% 0.05% 0.05% 0.05% 0.05% 0.05% 0.05% 0.05% 0.05%
%GNI Earmarked, other and non-EU 
distributed by EU28 GNI
0.13% 0.13% 0.13% 0.13% 0.13% 0.13% 0.13% 0.13% 0.13% 0.13% 0.13% 0.13% 0.13% 0.13% 0.13% 0.13% 0.13% 0.13% 0.13% 0.13% 0.13% 0.13% 0.13% 0.13% 0.13% 0.13% 0.13% 0.13% 0.13% 0.13%
%GNI Total actual payments 0.96% 1.06% 0.79% 4.64% 2.85% 0.67% 0.52% 3.17% 1.00% 3.41% 1.22% 0.77% 2.40% 0.84% 1.39% 3.80% 4.21% 1.07% 4.67% 2.01% 0.50% 0.68% 3.41% 2.39% 3.46% 2.10% 3.20% 0.79% 0.54% 0.47%
(B) 2014-20 MFF: administration, earmarked, other and non-EU expenditures are distrbuted among EU27
€ Total allocated payments w.o. 
admin
844,888 796,368 19,134 16,481 33,716 10,043 78,471 4,947 13,314 41,304 84,294 96,216 7,513 79,540 1,634 6,895 11,721 2,358 38,140 1,342 16,175 12,901 103,046 29,416 42,808 5,715 17,921 9,646 11,677 48,520
€ EU28 admin distributed by 
EU27 GNI
57,450 57,450 1,977 232 796 1,314 14,574 104 1,023 805 5,097 10,355 213 7,612 85 120 183 168 534 46 3,281 1,628 2,005 840 822 188 373 1,001 2,073 0
€ Earmarked and other distributed 
by EU28 GNI; non-EU 
distributed by EU27 GNI
143,813 130,478 4,490 528 1,807 2,984 33,099 237 2,323 1,828 11,577 23,517 485 17,289 194 272 416 380 1,214 105 7,452 3,697 4,554 1,908 1,868 427 847 2,273 4,707 13,335
€ Total actual payments 1,046,152 984,296 25,602 17,241 36,319 14,342 126,143 5,288 16,660 43,938 100,969 130,088 8,211 104,441 1,914 7,286 12,320 2,906 39,888 1,494 26,908 18,225 109,605 32,164 45,498 6,330 19,141 12,920 18,457 61,855
%GNI Total allocated payments w.o. 
admin
0.78% 0.87% 0.61% 4.46% 2.66% 0.48% 0.34% 2.98% 0.82% 3.22% 1.04% 0.58% 2.21% 0.66% 1.20% 3.62% 4.02% 0.88% 4.48% 1.82% 0.31% 0.50% 3.23% 2.20% 3.27% 1.91% 3.02% 0.61% 0.35% 0.29%
%GNI EU28 admin distributed by 
EU27 GNI
0.05% 0.06% 0.06% 0.06% 0.06% 0.06% 0.06% 0.06% 0.06% 0.06% 0.06% 0.06% 0.06% 0.06% 0.06% 0.06% 0.06% 0.06% 0.06% 0.06% 0.06% 0.06% 0.06% 0.06% 0.06% 0.06% 0.06% 0.06% 0.06% 0.00%
%GNI Earmarked and other distributed 
by EU28 GNI; non-EU 
distributed by EU27 GNI
0.13% 0.14% 0.14% 0.14% 0.14% 0.14% 0.14% 0.14% 0.14% 0.14% 0.14% 0.14% 0.14% 0.14% 0.14% 0.14% 0.14% 0.14% 0.14% 0.14% 0.14% 0.14% 0.14% 0.14% 0.14% 0.14% 0.14% 0.14% 0.14% 0.08%
%GNI Total actual payments 0.96% 1.08% 0.81% 4.66% 2.87% 0.69% 0.54% 3.19% 1.02% 3.43% 1.24% 0.79% 2.42% 0.86% 1.41% 3.82% 4.23% 1.09% 4.69% 2.03% 0.52% 0.70% 3.43% 2.41% 3.48% 2.12% 3.22% 0.81% 0.56% 0.36%
(C) 2021-2027 MFF for EU27
€ Total allocated payments w.o. 
admin
913,321 26,495 20,201 31,612 11,728 99,276 5,639 15,145 46,422 101,964 115,348 9,666 94,384 2,737 8,297 12,982 3,314 34,985 1,363 22,543 15,468 98,171 33,192 52,498 6,360 16,840 12,327 14,362 See 
note
€ EU27 admin distributed by 
EU27 GNI
72,191 2,427 358 1,139 1,674 18,118 158 1,530 967 6,438 12,565 289 8,697 118 173 266 243 792 71 4,166 2,077 2,986 1,076 1,359 267 520 1,254 2,464
€ Earmarked, other and non-EU 
distributed by EU27 GNI
223,547 7,516 1,108 3,526 5,185 56,106 488 4,737 2,993 19,936 38,908 895 26,932 366 535 823 753 2,453 221 12,900 6,433 9,246 3,332 4,208 826 1,610 3,882 7,630
€ Total actual payments 1,209,059 36,438 21,666 36,277 18,587 173,500 6,285 21,412 50,381 128,338 166,821 10,849 130,014 3,221 9,005 14,072 4,310 38,231 1,655 39,609 23,979 110,402 37,600 58,065 7,453 18,970 17,463 24,456
%GNI Total allocated payments w.o. 
admin
0.80% 0.69% 3.56% 1.75% 0.44% 0.35% 2.26% 0.62% 3.03% 1.00% 0.58% 2.11% 0.68% 1.46% 3.03% 3.08% 0.86% 2.79% 1.21% 0.34% 0.47% 2.07% 1.95% 2.44% 1.50% 2.04% 0.62% 0.37%
%GNI EU27 admin distributed by 
EU27 GNI
0.06% 0.06% 0.06% 0.06% 0.06% 0.06% 0.06% 0.06% 0.06% 0.06% 0.06% 0.06% 0.06% 0.06% 0.06% 0.06% 0.06% 0.06% 0.06% 0.06% 0.06% 0.06% 0.06% 0.06% 0.06% 0.06% 0.06% 0.06%
%GNI Earmarked, other and non-EU 
distributed by EU27 GNI
0.20% 0.20% 0.20% 0.20% 0.20% 0.20% 0.20% 0.20% 0.20% 0.20% 0.20% 0.20% 0.20% 0.20% 0.20% 0.20% 0.20% 0.20% 0.20% 0.20% 0.20% 0.20% 0.20% 0.20% 0.20% 0.20% 0.20% 0.20%
%GNI Total actual payments 1.06% 0.95% 3.82% 2.01% 0.70% 0.60% 2.52% 0.88% 3.29% 1.26% 0.84% 2.37% 0.94% 1.72% 3.29% 3.34% 1.12% 3.04% 1.46% 0.60% 0.73% 2.33% 2.20% 2.69% 1.76% 2.30% 0.88% 0.63%
(D) Percent change from panel (B) to panel (C)
Total allocated payments w.o. 
admin
15% 38% 23% -6% 17% 27% 14% 14% 12% 21% 20% 29% 19% 67% 20% 11% 41% -8% 2% 39% 20% -5% 13% 23% 11% -6% 28% 23%
Admin distributed by GNI 26% 23% 54% 43% 27% 24% 51% 50% 20% 26% 21% 35% 14% 38% 44% 45% 45% 48% 54% 27% 28% 49% 28% 65% 42% 39% 25% 19%
Earmarked, other and non-EU 
distributed by GNI
71% 67% 110% 95% 74% 70% 106% 104% 64% 72% 65% 85% 56% 89% 97% 98% 98% 102% 110% 73% 74% 103% 75% 125% 93% 90% 71% 62%
Total actual payments 23% 42% 26% 0% 30% 38% 19% 29% 15% 27% 28% 32% 24% 68% 24% 14% 48% -4% 11% 47% 32% 1% 17% 28% 18% -1% 35% 33%
(E) Percent change in GNI from 2014-20 to 2021-2027
GNI 25% 22% 53% 43% 27% 24% 51% 49% 20% 26% 21% 35% 14% 38% 44% 45% 45% 48% 54% 26% 27% 48% 28% 65% 41% 39% 25% 18% 22%
EU28 EU27 BE BG CZ DK DE EE IE EL ES FR HR IT CY LV LT LU HU MT NL AT PL PT RO SI SK FI SE UK
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Table 4a: Revenues of the 2021-2027 MFF, Scenario 1 – rebates abolished from 1 January 2021 (€ millions and percent of GNI) 
 
Source: Bruegel. Note: in the Juncker Commission’s MFF proposal, total commitment ceiling amounts to €1,279,408, or 1.11% of GNI, while total payment appropriations ceiling amounts to €1,246,263, or 1.08% 
of GNI. I use the euro values from the MFF proposal but divide them by the most recent estimate of GNI (based on the IMF’s October 2019 IMF and the European Commission’s November 2019 forecasts), which is 
about 1 percent lower than the assumption used in the MFF proposal. This explains that the same euro values correspond to marginally higher ratios of GNI in my calculations, 1.12% and 1.09% of GNI, 
respectively. GNI-based contributions are 0.03% of GNI higher for euro-area members, because I assume that only euro-area members contribute to the euro budget. 
EU27 BE BG CZ DK DE EE IE EL ES FR HR IT CY LV LT LU HU MT NL AT PL PT RO SI SK FI SE
GNI-based own resource 516,040 17,495 2,439 7,764 11,416 130,598 1,136 11,027 6,967 46,405 90,566 1,970 62,691 852 1,245 1,917 1,753 5,401 514 30,029 14,974 20,357 7,756 9,265 1,923 3,747 9,036 16,799
VAT-based own resource 265,468 8,432 1,724 4,712 6,831 69,801 769 3,963 3,586 21,584 47,198 1,700 25,928 682 753 1,090 1,492 3,166 343 14,291 8,475 11,774 4,486 4,966 1,085 1,991 5,077 9,569
Proposed phasing out of corrections 0
Compensation for proposed phasing 
out of corrections
0
Reduced VAT call rate 0
Compensation for reduced VAT call 
rate
0
Lump sum reduction for DK, NL & SE 0
Compensation for lump sum reduction 
for DK, NL & SE
0
FSJ adjustment for Denmark and 
Ireland
0 5 1 3 -93 41 0 -63 2 15 28 1 20 0 0 1 1 2 0 9 5 7 2 3 1 1 3 6
Total national contribution 781,508 25,932 4,164 12,478 18,154 200,440 1,905 14,926 10,556 68,004 137,793 3,670 88,638 1,534 1,999 3,007 3,245 8,569 857 44,329 23,453 32,137 12,244 14,235 3,008 5,739 14,116 26,374
Customs duties (100%) 197,107 22,503 1,153 3,036 3,858 45,458 406 3,582 2,092 15,953 19,011 491 20,262 281 493 1,140 220 2,633 146 28,997 2,289 9,492 2,152 2,451 997 1,131 1,512 5,368
10% retained as collection costs 19,711 2,250 115 304 386 4,546 41 358 209 1,595 1,901 49 2,026 28 49 114 22 263 15 2,900 229 949 215 245 100 113 151 537
Traditional own resources (90%) 177,397 20,253 1,037 2,732 3,472 40,912 365 3,224 1,882 14,357 17,110 442 18,236 253 444 1,026 198 2,369 132 26,098 2,060 8,542 1,936 2,206 897 1,018 1,361 4,832
CCCTB-based own resources 94,500 3,539 643 1,871 2,208 22,890 263 5,968 984 8,399 12,031 310 10,005 140 236 542 543 1,158 166 6,100 2,887 3,949 1,312 2,248 307 847 1,746 3,210
ETS-based own resources 14,700 496 315 583 245 3,479 129 183 581 1,496 1,072 74 1,886 27 34 72 24 230 16 656 272 1,134 297 614 72 214 327 174
Plastic-based own resources 42,000 1,008 266 502 712 8,085 253 920 599 4,321 8,395 167 6,623 32 131 87 101 1,100 58 1,267 1,027 2,758 1,144 968 91 300 476 610
Total new own resources 151,200 5,043 1,223 2,955 3,165 34,454 645 7,072 2,164 14,216 21,497 551 18,513 199 401 701 667 2,487 240 8,022 4,187 7,841 2,752 3,830 471 1,360 2,549 3,994
Total own resources 1,110,104 51,228 6,425 18,166 24,791 275,806 2,915 25,222 14,602 96,578 176,400 4,663 125,388 1,986 2,844 4,734 4,111 13,426 1,229 78,450 29,700 48,521 16,933 20,270 4,376 8,117 18,026 35,200
Brexit 19,830
Other revenue 79,124
Total revenue (= actual payments) 1,209,059   (← my estimation)
Total payment appropriations 1,246,263   (← from the MFF proposal; included here for information only)
Total commitment appropriations 1,279,408   (← from the MFF proposal; included here for information only)
% GNI values
GNI-based own resource 0.45% 0.45% 0.43% 0.43% 0.43% 0.45% 0.45% 0.45% 0.45% 0.45% 0.45% 0.43% 0.45% 0.45% 0.45% 0.45% 0.45% 0.43% 0.45% 0.45% 0.45% 0.43% 0.45% 0.43% 0.45% 0.45% 0.45% 0.43%
VAT-based own resource 0.23% 0.22% 0.30% 0.26% 0.26% 0.24% 0.31% 0.16% 0.23% 0.21% 0.24% 0.37% 0.19% 0.36% 0.27% 0.26% 0.39% 0.25% 0.30% 0.22% 0.26% 0.25% 0.26% 0.23% 0.26% 0.24% 0.26% 0.24%
All corrections 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Total national contribution 0.68% 0.67% 0.73% 0.69% 0.68% 0.70% 0.76% 0.62% 0.69% 0.67% 0.69% 0.80% 0.64% 0.82% 0.73% 0.71% 0.84% 0.68% 0.76% 0.67% 0.71% 0.68% 0.72% 0.66% 0.71% 0.70% 0.71% 0.68%
Traditional own resources (90%) 0.15% 0.53% 0.18% 0.15% 0.13% 0.14% 0.15% 0.13% 0.12% 0.14% 0.09% 0.10% 0.13% 0.14% 0.16% 0.24% 0.05% 0.19% 0.12% 0.40% 0.06% 0.18% 0.11% 0.10% 0.21% 0.12% 0.07% 0.12%
Total new own resources 0.13% 0.13% 0.22% 0.16% 0.12% 0.12% 0.26% 0.29% 0.14% 0.14% 0.11% 0.12% 0.13% 0.11% 0.15% 0.17% 0.17% 0.20% 0.21% 0.12% 0.13% 0.17% 0.16% 0.18% 0.11% 0.17% 0.13% 0.10%
Total own resources 0.97% 1.33% 1.13% 1.01% 0.93% 0.96% 1.17% 1.04% 0.95% 0.95% 0.89% 1.02% 0.91% 1.06% 1.04% 1.12% 1.07% 1.07% 1.09% 1.19% 0.90% 1.02% 0.99% 0.94% 1.03% 0.98% 0.91% 0.90%
Brexit 0.02%
Other revenue 0.07%
Total revenue (= actual payments) 1.06%
Total payment appropriations 1.09%
Total commitment appropriations 1.12%
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Table 4b: Revenues of the 2021-2027 MFF, Scenario 2 – rebates gradually abolished as proposed by the Commission (€ millions and percent of GNI) 
 
Source: Bruegel. Note: in the Juncker Commission’s MFF proposal, total commitment ceiling amounts to €1,279,408, or 1.11% of GNI, while total payment appropriations ceiling amounts to €1,246,263, or 1.08% 
of GNI. I use the euro values from the MFF proposal but divide them by the most recent estimate of GNI (based on the IMF’s October 2019 IMF and the European Commission’s November 2019 forecasts), which is 
about 1 percent lower than the assumption used in the MFF proposal. This explains that the same euro values correspond to marginally higher ratios of GNI in my calculations, 1.12% and 1.09% of GNI, 
respectively. GNI-based contributions are 0.03% of GNI higher for euro-area members, because I assume that only euro-area members contribute to the euro budget. 
EU27 BE BG CZ DK DE EE IE EL ES FR HR IT CY LV LT LU HU MT NL AT PL PT RO SI SK FI SE
GNI-based own resource 516,040 17,495 2,439 7,764 11,416 130,598 1,136 11,027 6,967 46,405 90,566 1,970 62,691 852 1,245 1,917 1,753 5,401 514 30,029 14,974 20,357 7,756 9,265 1,923 3,747 9,036 16,799
VAT-based own resource 265,468 8,432 1,724 4,712 6,831 69,801 769 3,963 3,586 21,584 47,198 1,700 25,928 682 753 1,090 1,492 3,166 343 14,291 8,475 11,774 4,486 4,966 1,085 1,991 5,077 9,569
Proposed phasing out of corrections -21,970 -530 -12,645 -5,687 -497 -2,611
Compensation for proposed phasing 
out of corrections
21,970 739 109 347 510 5,514 48 466 294 1,959 3,824 88 2,647 36 53 81 74 241 22 1,268 632 909 327 414 81 158 382 750
Reduced VAT call rate 0
Compensation for reduced VAT call 
rate
0
Lump sum reduction for DK, NL & SE 0
Compensation for lump sum reduction 
for DK, NL & SE
0
FSJ adjustment for Denmark and 
Ireland
0 5 1 3 -93 41 0 -63 2 15 28 1 20 0 0 1 1 2 0 9 5 7 2 3 1 1 3 6
Total national contribution 781,508 26,671 4,273 12,825 18,133 193,309 1,953 15,392 10,850 69,963 141,617 3,758 91,285 1,570 2,051 3,088 3,319 8,810 879 39,911 23,589 33,046 12,572 14,648 3,089 5,897 14,498 24,513
Customs duties (100%) 197,107 22,503 1,153 3,036 3,858 45,458 406 3,582 2,092 15,953 19,011 491 20,262 281 493 1,140 220 2,633 146 28,997 2,289 9,492 2,152 2,451 997 1,131 1,512 5,368
10% retained as collection costs 19,711 2,250 115 304 386 4,546 41 358 209 1,595 1,901 49 2,026 28 49 114 22 263 15 2,900 229 949 215 245 100 113 151 537
Traditional own resources (90%) 177,397 20,253 1,037 2,732 3,472 40,912 365 3,224 1,882 14,357 17,110 442 18,236 253 444 1,026 198 2,369 132 26,098 2,060 8,542 1,936 2,206 897 1,018 1,361 4,832
CCCTB-based own resources 94,500 3,539 643 1,871 2,208 22,890 263 5,968 984 8,399 12,031 310 10,005 140 236 542 543 1,158 166 6,100 2,887 3,949 1,312 2,248 307 847 1,746 3,210
ETS-based own resources 14,700 496 315 583 245 3,479 129 183 581 1,496 1,072 74 1,886 27 34 72 24 230 16 656 272 1,134 297 614 72 214 327 174
Plastic-based own resources 42,000 1,008 266 502 712 8,085 253 920 599 4,321 8,395 167 6,623 32 131 87 101 1,100 58 1,267 1,027 2,758 1,144 968 91 300 476 610
Total new own resources 151,200 5,043 1,223 2,955 3,165 34,454 645 7,072 2,164 14,216 21,497 551 18,513 199 401 701 667 2,487 240 8,022 4,187 7,841 2,752 3,830 471 1,360 2,549 3,994
Total own resources 1,110,104 51,967 6,533 18,512 24,770 268,675 2,963 25,688 14,896 98,537 180,224 4,751 128,034 2,022 2,896 4,815 4,185 13,667 1,251 74,031 29,835 49,429 17,260 20,684 4,457 8,275 18,408 33,339
Brexit 19,830
Other revenue 79,124
Total revenue (= actual payments) 1,209,059   (← my estimation)
Total payment appropriations 1,246,263   (← from the MFF proposal; included here for information only)
Total commitment appropriations 1,279,408   (← from the MFF proposal; included here for information only)
% GNI values
GNI-based own resource 0.45% 0.45% 0.43% 0.43% 0.43% 0.45% 0.45% 0.45% 0.45% 0.45% 0.45% 0.43% 0.45% 0.45% 0.45% 0.45% 0.45% 0.43% 0.45% 0.45% 0.45% 0.43% 0.45% 0.43% 0.45% 0.45% 0.45% 0.43%
VAT-based own resource 0.23% 0.22% 0.30% 0.26% 0.26% 0.24% 0.31% 0.16% 0.23% 0.21% 0.24% 0.37% 0.19% 0.36% 0.27% 0.26% 0.39% 0.25% 0.30% 0.22% 0.26% 0.25% 0.26% 0.23% 0.26% 0.24% 0.26% 0.24%
All corrections 0.00% 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 0.00% -0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% -0.07% 0.00% 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% -0.05%
Total national contribution 0.68% 0.69% 0.75% 0.71% 0.68% 0.67% 0.78% 0.63% 0.71% 0.69% 0.71% 0.82% 0.66% 0.84% 0.75% 0.73% 0.86% 0.70% 0.78% 0.60% 0.72% 0.70% 0.74% 0.68% 0.73% 0.72% 0.73% 0.63%
Traditional own resources (90%) 0.15% 0.53% 0.18% 0.15% 0.13% 0.14% 0.15% 0.13% 0.12% 0.14% 0.09% 0.10% 0.13% 0.14% 0.16% 0.24% 0.05% 0.19% 0.12% 0.40% 0.06% 0.18% 0.11% 0.10% 0.21% 0.12% 0.07% 0.12%
Total new own resources 0.13% 0.13% 0.22% 0.16% 0.12% 0.12% 0.26% 0.29% 0.14% 0.14% 0.11% 0.12% 0.13% 0.11% 0.15% 0.17% 0.17% 0.20% 0.21% 0.12% 0.13% 0.17% 0.16% 0.18% 0.11% 0.17% 0.13% 0.10%
Total own resources 0.97% 1.35% 1.15% 1.03% 0.93% 0.94% 1.19% 1.06% 0.97% 0.97% 0.90% 1.04% 0.93% 1.08% 1.06% 1.14% 1.09% 1.09% 1.11% 1.12% 0.91% 1.04% 1.01% 0.96% 1.05% 1.00% 0.93% 0.85%
Brexit 0.02%
Other revenue 0.07%
Total revenue (= actual payments) 1.06%
Total payment appropriations 1.09%
Total commitment appropriations 1.12%
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Table 4c: Revenues of the 2021-2027 MFF, Scenario 3 – rebates remain (except UK rebate and rebates on UK rebate) (€ millions and percent of GNI) 
 
Source: Bruegel. Note: in the Juncker Commission’s MFF proposal, total commitment ceiling amounts to €1,279,408, or 1.11% of GNI, while total payment appropriations ceiling amounts to €1,246,263, or 1.08% 
of GNI. I use the euro values from the MFF proposal but divide them by the most recent estimate of GNI (based on the IMF’s October 2019 IMF and the European Commission’s November 2019 forecasts), which is 
about 1 percent lower than the assumption used in the MFF proposal. This explains that the same euro values correspond to marginally higher ratios of GNI in my calculations, 1.12% and 1.09% of GNI, 
respectively. GNI-based contributions are 0.03% of GNI higher for euro-area members, because I assume that only euro-area members contribute to the euro budget. 
EU27 BE BG CZ DK DE EE IE EL ES FR HR IT CY LV LT LU HU MT NL AT PL PT RO SI SK FI SE
GNI-based own resource 516,040 17,495 2,439 7,764 11,416 130,598 1,136 11,027 6,967 46,405 90,566 1,970 62,691 852 1,245 1,917 1,753 5,401 514 30,029 14,974 20,357 7,756 9,265 1,923 3,747 9,036 16,799
VAT-based own resource 265,468 8,432 1,724 4,712 6,831 69,801 769 3,963 3,586 21,584 47,198 1,700 25,928 682 753 1,090 1,492 3,166 343 14,291 8,475 11,774 4,486 4,966 1,085 1,991 5,077 9,569
Proposed phasing out of corrections 0
Compensation for proposed phasing 
out of corrections
0
Reduced VAT call rate -46,831 -34900 -7145.7 -4784
Compensation for reduced VAT call 
rate
46,831 1,575 232 739 1,086 11,753 102 992 627 4,176 8,151 187 5,642 77 112 173 158 514 46 2,703 1,348 1,937 698 882 173 337 813 1,598
Lump sum reduction for DK, NL & SE -9,153 -1178 -6298.3 -1677
Compensation for lump sum reduction 
for DK, NL & SE
9,153 308 45 144 212 2,297 20 194 123 816 1,593 37 1,103 15 22 34 31 100 9 528 263 379 136 172 34 66 159 312
FSJ adjustment for Denmark and 
Ireland
0 5 1 3 -93 41 0 -63 2 15 28 1 20 0 0 1 1 2 0 9 5 7 2 3 1 1 3 6
Total national contribution 781,508 27,814 4,441 13,361 18,274 179,590 2,027 16,113 11,305 72,997 147,537 3,894 95,383 1,625 2,133 3,213 3,434 9,183 912 34,116 25,064 34,453 13,078 15,288 3,215 6,142 15,088 21,824
Customs duties (100%) 197,107 22,503 1,153 3,036 3,858 45,458 406 3,582 2,092 15,953 19,011 491 20,262 281 493 1,140 220 2,633 146 28,997 2,289 9,492 2,152 2,451 997 1,131 1,512 5,368
10% retained as collection costs 19,711 2,250 115 304 386 4,546 41 358 209 1,595 1,901 49 2,026 28 49 114 22 263 15 2,900 229 949 215 245 100 113 151 537
Traditional own resources (90%) 177,397 20,253 1,037 2,732 3,472 40,912 365 3,224 1,882 14,357 17,110 442 18,236 253 444 1,026 198 2,369 132 26,098 2,060 8,542 1,936 2,206 897 1,018 1,361 4,832
CCCTB-based own resources 94,500 3,539 643 1,871 2,208 22,890 263 5,968 984 8,399 12,031 310 10,005 140 236 542 543 1,158 166 6,100 2,887 3,949 1,312 2,248 307 847 1,746 3,210
ETS-based own resources 14,700 496 315 583 245 3,479 129 183 581 1,496 1,072 74 1,886 27 34 72 24 230 16 656 272 1,134 297 614 72 214 327 174
Plastic-based own resources 42,000 1,008 266 502 712 8,085 253 920 599 4,321 8,395 167 6,623 32 131 87 101 1,100 58 1,267 1,027 2,758 1,144 968 91 300 476 610
Total new own resources 151,200 5,043 1,223 2,955 3,165 34,454 645 7,072 2,164 14,216 21,497 551 18,513 199 401 701 667 2,487 240 8,022 4,187 7,841 2,752 3,830 471 1,360 2,549 3,994
Total own resources 1,110,104 53,111 6,702 19,049 24,911 254,956 3,037 26,408 15,351 101,570 186,144 4,887 132,132 2,077 2,978 4,940 4,300 14,040 1,284 68,236 31,311 50,836 17,767 21,324 4,583 8,520 18,999 30,650
Brexit 19,830
Other revenue 79,124
Total revenue (= actual payments) 1,209,059   (← my estimation)
Total payment appropriations 1,246,263   (← from the MFF proposal; included here for information only)
Total commitment appropriations 1,279,408   (← from the MFF proposal; included here for information only)
% GNI values
GNI-based own resource 0.45% 0.45% 0.43% 0.43% 0.43% 0.45% 0.45% 0.45% 0.45% 0.45% 0.45% 0.43% 0.45% 0.45% 0.45% 0.45% 0.45% 0.43% 0.45% 0.45% 0.45% 0.43% 0.45% 0.43% 0.45% 0.45% 0.45% 0.43%
VAT-based own resource 0.23% 0.22% 0.30% 0.26% 0.26% 0.24% 0.31% 0.16% 0.23% 0.21% 0.24% 0.37% 0.19% 0.36% 0.27% 0.26% 0.39% 0.25% 0.30% 0.22% 0.26% 0.25% 0.26% 0.23% 0.26% 0.24% 0.26% 0.24%
All corrections 0.00% 0.05% 0.05% 0.05% 0.00% -0.07% 0.05% 0.05% 0.05% 0.05% 0.05% 0.05% 0.05% 0.05% 0.05% 0.05% 0.05% 0.05% 0.05% -0.15% 0.05% 0.05% 0.05% 0.05% 0.05% 0.05% 0.05% -0.12%
Total national contribution 0.68% 0.72% 0.78% 0.74% 0.69% 0.63% 0.81% 0.66% 0.74% 0.72% 0.74% 0.85% 0.69% 0.87% 0.78% 0.76% 0.89% 0.73% 0.81% 0.52% 0.76% 0.73% 0.77% 0.71% 0.76% 0.75% 0.76% 0.56%
Traditional own resources (90%) 0.15% 0.53% 0.18% 0.15% 0.13% 0.14% 0.15% 0.13% 0.12% 0.14% 0.09% 0.10% 0.13% 0.14% 0.16% 0.24% 0.05% 0.19% 0.12% 0.40% 0.06% 0.18% 0.11% 0.10% 0.21% 0.12% 0.07% 0.12%
Total new own resources 0.13% 0.13% 0.22% 0.16% 0.12% 0.12% 0.26% 0.29% 0.14% 0.14% 0.11% 0.12% 0.13% 0.11% 0.15% 0.17% 0.17% 0.20% 0.21% 0.12% 0.13% 0.17% 0.16% 0.18% 0.11% 0.17% 0.13% 0.10%
Total own resources 0.97% 1.38% 1.18% 1.06% 0.94% 0.89% 1.22% 1.09% 1.00% 1.00% 0.93% 1.07% 0.96% 1.11% 1.09% 1.17% 1.12% 1.12% 1.14% 1.03% 0.95% 1.07% 1.04% 0.99% 1.08% 1.03% 0.96% 0.78%
Brexit 0.02%
Other revenue 0.07%
Total revenue (= actual payments) 1.06%
Total payment appropriations 1.09%
Total commitment appropriations 1.12%
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Table 5: Net balances in the 2014-2020 and 2021-2027 MFFs under alternative scenarios for the rebates (€ millions and percent of GNI) 
 
Source: Bruegel. 
 
BE BG CZ DK DE EE IE EL ES FR HR IT CY LV LT LU HU MT NL AT PL PT RO SI SK FI SE
A) 2014-2020 MFF
Operating budgetary balance 
(OBB), € millions per year -1,096 1,838 3,358 -832 -12,952 441 15 4,292 1,967 -6,582 367 -3,815 48 712 1,240 4 4,448 96 -2,459 -1,075 10,219 2,319 4,440 446 1,750 -521 -1,671
% GNI -0.26% 3.89% 2.01% -0.29% -0.40% 2.06% 0.01% 2.41% 0.18% -0.29% 0.81% -0.23% 0.26% 2.75% 3.24% 0.01% 3.97% 1.02% -0.35% -0.30% 2.39% 1.27% 2.61% 1.11% 2.18% -0.24% -0.36%
Net direct balance (NDB), € 
millions per year -2,155 1,866 3,466 -573 -10,238 458 185 4,515 2,910 -3,376 421 -2,013 66 732 1,242 61 4,538 104 -3,356 -543 10,525 2,565 4,649 466 1,824 -195 -1,219
% GNI -0.50% 3.94% 2.07% -0.20% -0.32% 2.14% 0.09% 2.53% 0.26% -0.15% 0.93% -0.12% 0.36% 2.83% 3.24% 0.17% 4.05% 1.10% -0.47% -0.15% 2.46% 1.40% 2.73% 1.15% 2.27% -0.09% -0.26%
B) 2021-2027 MFF, Scenario 1 – rebates abolished from 1 January 2021
Operating budgetary balance 
(OBB), € millions per year -544 2,191 2,433 -1,355 -19,282 488 -328 4,869 3,213 -6,526 768 -1,315 135 852 1,353 -68 3,567 52 -4,180 -1,706 8,659 2,698 5,123 406 1,448 -596 -2,351
% GNI -0.10% 2.70% 0.94% -0.36% -0.47% 1.37% -0.09% 2.22% 0.22% -0.23% 1.17% -0.07% 0.50% 2.18% 2.25% -0.12% 1.99% 0.32% -0.44% -0.36% 1.28% 1.11% 1.66% 0.67% 1.23% -0.21% -0.42%
Net direct balance (NDB), € 
millions per year -2,113 2,177 2,587 -886 -14,615 481 -544 5,111 4,537 -1,368 884 661 176 880 1,334 28 3,544 61 -5,549 -817 8,840 2,952 5,399 440 1,550 -81 -1,535
% GNI -0.38% 2.69% 1.00% -0.23% -0.36% 1.35% -0.16% 2.33% 0.31% -0.05% 1.35% 0.03% 0.66% 2.25% 2.21% 0.05% 1.97% 0.38% -0.59% -0.17% 1.31% 1.21% 1.75% 0.73% 1.32% -0.03% -0.28%
C) 2021-2027 MFF, Scenario 2 – rebates gradually abolished as proposed by the Juncker Commission 
Operating budgetary balance 
(OBB), € millions per year -668 2,173 2,375 -1,352 -18,091 480 -406 4,820 2,886 -7,165 753 -1,757 129 843 1,339 -81 3,527 48 -3,443 -1,728 8,507 2,643 5,054 393 1,421 -659 -2,041
% GNI -0.12% 2.68% 0.92% -0.36% -0.44% 1.34% -0.12% 2.20% 0.20% -0.25% 1.15% -0.09% 0.48% 2.15% 2.22% -0.15% 1.97% 0.30% -0.36% -0.37% 1.26% 1.08% 1.64% 0.65% 1.21% -0.23% -0.37%
Net direct balance (NDB), € 
millions per year -2,218 2,162 2,538 -883 -13,596 475 -611 5,069 4,257 -1,915 871 283 171 873 1,322 18 3,509 58 -4,917 -837 8,710 2,906 5,340 428 1,528 -135 -1,269
% GNI -0.40% 2.67% 0.98% -0.23% -0.33% 1.33% -0.18% 2.32% 0.29% -0.07% 1.33% 0.01% 0.64% 2.23% 2.20% 0.03% 1.96% 0.36% -0.52% -0.18% 1.29% 1.19% 1.73% 0.71% 1.30% -0.05% -0.23%
D) 2021-2027 MFF, Scenario 3 – rebates remain (except UK rebate and rebates on UK rebate)
Operating budgetary balance 
(OBB), € millions per year -859 2,144 2,285 -1,375 -15,801 467 -526 4,744 2,379 -8,153 731 -2,441 120 829 1,318 -100 3,465 42 -2,475 -1,975 8,272 2,558 4,947 372 1,380 -758 -1,592
% GNI -0.16% 2.65% 0.89% -0.36% -0.39% 1.31% -0.15% 2.17% 0.16% -0.29% 1.12% -0.12% 0.45% 2.12% 2.19% -0.18% 1.93% 0.26% -0.26% -0.42% 1.22% 1.05% 1.61% 0.62% 1.17% -0.27% -0.29%
Net direct balance (NDB), € 
millions per year -2,382 2,138 2,461 -903 -11,637 464 -714 5,004 3,824 -2,760 852 -303 163 861 1,304 2 3,456 53 -4,090 -1,048 8,509 2,833 5,249 410 1,493 -219 -885
% GNI -0.43% 2.64% 0.95% -0.24% -0.28% 1.30% -0.21% 2.29% 0.26% -0.10% 1.30% -0.02% 0.61% 2.20% 2.17% 0.00% 1.93% 0.33% -0.43% -0.22% 1.26% 1.16% 1.71% 0.68% 1.27% -0.08% -0.16%
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